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I. ONTOLOGICAL AND NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS IN CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY
According to Lisa Guenther’s (2020) concise account, critical phenomenology seeks to expose 
not only the transcendental conditions of  seeing and making the world (such as subjectivity, 
embodiment, and temporality), but the “quasi-transcendental” ones we find in contingent 
historical and social structures, such as white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity 
(12). This excellent formulation raises the question of  its central distinction: from what 
position would the critical phenomenologist be able to distinguish transcendental from 
quasi-transcendental conditions, or universal from contingent structures? This question 
recalls post-Heideggerian treatments of  transcendental historicity (Crowell & Malpas 2007) 
and the possibilities of  critical theorizing, e.g., the Habermas-Gadamer debate on lifeworld 
and critique (How 1995). These issues also remind us of  earlier attempts to forge alliances 
between (post-)phenomenology and critical theory by scholars shuttling between Freiburg 
(or Paris) and Frankfurt. At times, these went under the label “critical ontology” and often 
sought to develop a coherent vision out of  Western Marxism and phenomenology, with 
a special focus, it seems, on Theodor Adorno and Martin Heidegger (Dallmayr 1991; 
Guzzoni 1990; Mörchen 1981; Macdonald & Ziarek 2008).1
 
* This article freely draws from a week-long seminar I gave at the 2019 Collegium Phaenomenologicum. For 
excellent comments and discussion, I thank the participants, the marvelously generous Director Anne 
O’Byrne, her assistant Adam Blair, as well as two truly engaged anonymous referees. I intend to elaborate 
the ideas presented here in a monograph, tentatively entitled Phenomenology and Critique: Outline of  a Critical 
Social Theory and its Sources of  Normativity.
1 Already in 1991, Dallmayr’s Between Freiburg and Frankfurt used the label “critical phenomenology” (viii). 
Associating phenomenology more with Husserl, he meant by it “a blending of  French existentialism and 
Habermasian critical theory” whose “rationalist and Cartesian overtones” he came to reject in favour of  
a “critical ontology” or “critique-engendering ontology” (ix) that takes to heart Heidegger’s and Adorno’s 
problematizations of  these overtones (while also drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and others).
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 In publishing the following reading of  Heidegger and Jacques Derrida in this journal, 
it is my hope that we can still learn from these attempts. What seems most apt today, 
perhaps, are the links between Heidegger’s critique of  technology and the Marxist critique 
of  capitalism, including its inaugurating and ongoing state violence in what Karl Marx 
called primitive accumulation and colonial dispossession (Marx 1990; Coulthard 2014; 
Nichols 2020). It may help to note at the outset that below we will present some of  Derrida’s 
central moral and political concepts, in particular double affirmation, as both a reading of  
Heidegger and a “radicalization” of  Marxist critique. The primary focus of  my remarks 
here, however, will be on how such critique is possible. For Guenther’s formulation of  
critical phenomenology also raises the issue of  the sources of  critique: on what grounds 
can the critical phenomenologist reject certain contingent structures of  world-seeing and 
world-making, and affirm others? Which implicit or explicit visions of  world are guiding 
the attempt to expose some contingent structures as problematic? Accordingly, I will first 
focus on what allows Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology to criticize technological 
mastery. I will then try to show how Derrida appropriates and transforms Heidegger’s 
account. Finally, I will discuss what this transformation implies for a deconstruction that 
situates critics in inherited, co-constitutive life world structures from which they cannot 
fully extricate themselves, but without this historicity prohibiting the projection of  revisable 
visions of  a better world.
 Such visions, we might say in all brevity here, must address both ontological and 
normative demands, despite the widespread tendency to regard one as primary. The 
concern for normative adequacy tends toward a coherent and idealized set of  moral beliefs 
and on justifying norms. By contrast, a primarily ontological approach hearkens back to 
the older meaning of  “ethics” as an abode or dwelling (ethos), and insists that moral and 
political philosophy first and foremost consider, not why and how much we owe according 
to some principle, but how human beings are constituted in relation to each other and 
situated in the contexts in which social and terrestrial life occurs. 
 These two approaches to moral and political theorizing are often at loggerheads, each 
with its own specific dangers. The danger that comes with stressing normative adequacy 
(probably the dominant mode of  doing political philosophy in the English-speaking world 
over the last five decades) is to smuggle in an inadequate ontology, e.g., an overly individualist 
one with an “unencumbered self ” (Sandel 1998, xiv, et passim). By contrast, giving 
priority to ontological considerations may violate the neutrality of  a liberal-democratic 
state regarding what makes human lives meaningful. Further, it may smuggle in normative 
assumptions without justification, or not help us think about the extent and content of  
normative structures at all. 
 For the purposes of  this paper, I will assume (without argument) that in our times of  
wide-spread environmental and political crisis, the ideal normative approach is historically 
insensitive and tends to be impotent (Mills 2005, 2014; Valentini 2012), so what we need 
above all is a new “ethical” understanding of  who we are and how we inhabit our world 
in relation to the earth. Putting the matter in this way already admits its affinity with 
Heidegger’s diagnosis of  what he terms the age of  enframing (the Gestell), and its relation to 
what is now often called the Anthropocene (cf. Borgmann 2020). Heidegger (1976) responds 
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to the demand for an ethics by first questioning the demand itself, which he suspects stems 
from a disorientation in the age of  technology. Technology, he suggests, asks the human 
being (surreptitiously, as we will see) to “correspond” to the dictates of  the enframing by 
itself  achieving predictable constancy in standing-in-reserve. This calculable constancy is 
to be achieved by an axiological ethics of  rules that he sees as “merely the power-driven 
machination of  reason” (nur das Gemächte menschlicher Vernunft) (Heidegger 1976, 361/1998, 
274), a reason that misunderstands itself  as severed from its immersion in world and in 
the fourfold disclosure of  being. The demand for an ethics further seems to presuppose a 
problematic division between logic, physics and ethics that Heidegger’s phenomenological 
ontology seeks to overcome. The ancient division helps prepare modern nihilism, which 
first reduces all physical being to mere matter and blind forces, thereby denying things their 
own coming forth, and then re-values nature selectively by projecting human values on to it 
(Farin 1998). This value subjectivism gives rise to the illusion, today perhaps best expressed 
in the geological notion of  the Anthropocene, that wherever they look, human beings 
encounter only themselves (see Taylor 2003). Nature, however, may precisely conceal its 
being in the face it offers to “technical appropriation” (technische Bemächtigung) (Heidegger 
1976, 324/1998, 247).
 In response, Heidegger proposes the rethinking of  being as itself  already, as the by now 
famous words have it, an “originary ethics” (Heidegger 1976, 356/1998, 271). Heidegger 
traces this originary ethics back to Being and Time’s (1927/2008) determination of  the human 
being as ek-sisting in the care for its being. Reinterpreting Being and Time, he argues that 
Dasein’s fundamental ek-sistence—that is, its constitutive being extended into the world, 
thus its differential belonging—is neither metaphysical essence nor existence, but is “the 
guardianship, that is, care for being” (1976, 343/1998, 261). While the notion of  care refers 
us back to Being and Time’s account, which found the origin of  responsibility in the stretching-
out of  Dasein between thrownness and death (see Haugeland 1998; Crowell 2013), the 
account in this later period (roughly, 1945 onwards) relocates the source in the relation 
between the claim of  Being (Anspruch, also Zuspruch and Zusage) and the corresponding 
(Entsprechen) letting-be and dwelling of  the human being. Decisive in each case is the source 
of  normativity in difference and temporal non-coincidence: because Dasein is not simply 
what it is at any given time, it has to take over its being. (In the context of  reading Derrida 
below, I will characterize the normativity in question as a ‘normativity beyond norms,’ 
irreducible to but lending force to norms.)2 While Being and Time stressed the call’s origin 
in Dasein, the later work sees Dasein as always-already responsive to being’s call. In this 
later work, Heidegger found it misleading to make of  human existence the starting point 
of  the ontological inquiry into being. Instead, he emphasized the anteriority of  being and 
its calling. Along with this change came a transformation of  responsibility from the priority 
of  Dasein’s solicitous interrogation (sorgendes Fragen) of  being to affirming being and its 
address. In the Country Path Conversations (1995/2010), for instance, Heidegger suggests that 
questioning depends on a prior responding that is not itself  a response to a question. In 
2 I adapt the suggestive (if  perhaps also misleading) phrase “normativity beyond norms” from Bertram’s 
and Perpich’s “normativity without norms” (Bertram 2002a, 2006; Perpich 2008, 124ff.). 
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approaching the question of  being from the outset as a question, as Being and Time did, 
the questioners would already have lost their way (Heidegger 1995, 24/2010, 15). The 
question of  being demands recognizing the questioner’s belatedness: Dasein is not first of  
all questioning being but addressed by being and its ‘granting saying’ (Zusage) in language, 
a language that precedes Dasein and calls it into its being. In the context of  his originary 
ethics, then, Heidegger argues that being demands of  Dasein an originary, nonvoluntary 
affirmation of  being as well as of  language as the “house of  being” (1976, 313, 333, 358-
59/1998, 239, 254, 274). He calls this demand the claim (Anspruch) (1976, 313, 319, 358-
363/1998, 243, 272-75), the comforting word (Zuspruch) (1985, 170, 185/1982, 76, 90; 
see also Heidegger 1985, 67, 75; 1976, 150, 164—translated in Heidegger 1971, 146 as 
“primal call,” then at 159 as “summons”), the promise or command, bid or behest (Geheiss, 
Verheissung) (1985, 23, 26-30/1971, 204, 203-07, 1976, 360/1998, 273, where “Geheiss” is 
translated as “gathered call”; see also the essay “On the Question of  Being” in Heidegger 
1976, 408, 424); or the vow or granting saying of  being (Zusage) (1985, 165-66, 169-70, 
174/1982, 71, 76, 79-80; see also translator’s note, 1982, 78).
 Although the speaker would be being or language rather than a human individual, it is 
no accident that these terms appear to be performative speech acts: address, claim, word 
of  comfort or support, summons, promise, vow or saying. And indeed, the sense of  belated 
responsivity and elemental belonging—of  being thrown into a preceding-exceeding element 
beyond our control—as the source of  normativity is perhaps most accessible in the aspect of  
language. The Western tradition tends to define the human being as the being that speaks, 
but on Heidegger’s view, we speak only by responding to the prior speaking of  language 
itself, a speaking that claims and addresses us; we respond to the opening address and 
comforting word of  language, or the granting saying of  being. If  language is the “house of  
being” (Heidegger 1976, 313/1998, 239)—that is, the disclosure or “worlding” of  world is 
structured linguistically from the beginning—then it is language itself  that speaks, however 
counterintuitive that may sound. In many formulations of  this period, Heidegger links this 
claim or address (Zuspruch) with corresponding (Entsprechen), where of  course both notions 
are etymologically linked to language (Sprache): 
Language speaks. The human being speaks to the extent he [sic] 
corresponds [or speaks back] to language. This corresponding is 
listening. It hears because it belongs to the promise of  stillness [Die 
Sprache spricht. Der Mensch spricht, insofern er der Sprache entspricht. Das 
Entsprechen ist Hören. Es hört, insofern es dem Geheiß der Stille gehört.] (1985, 
30, translation modified/1971, 207)
The human belongs to a linguistically pre-structured world first of  all by listening to its call, 
by in fact always already responding to its precedence. The play on Sprache and Entsprechen 
(language and corresponding) is matched here by the play on Hören and Zugehören (listening 
and belonging; see also Heidegger 1976, 316/1998, 241; 1989, 407). We can pose questions, 
even regarding language itself, only by using language, and thus already moving within its 
element. In this sense, the affirmative response to, or corresponding with, language, would 
be prior to speaking and to questioning language. Similarly, we can ask after being only by 
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already dwelling within it.
 But of  course, despite the precedence we just asserted, language does not speak 
without speakers, and being does not address without addressees. We must be careful to 
not simply switch the active instance—the first speaker, the performer of  the speech act—
from the human speaker to being or language; rather, the matter to be thought calls on us 
to undo the dichotomies of  subject and object, activity and passivity. The normative or 
the performative here emerges precisely not with an already given subject and its activity, 
whether human or not (Fritsch 2013b). After all, if  being is the fourfold, the mortals are 
one of  its four next to earth, sky, and divinities. The claim of  the differentiated fourfold 
calls on us to think beyond the subject-object divide, for instance in the middle voice (Scott 
1988, 1990; Llewellyn 1991). It is in this middle position between activity and passivity, in 
the elemental milieu of  language and being, that normativity emerges. The crucial idea is 
still, as in Being and Time, that it is the very difference, the ek-sistence of  being and standing 
out into the world, that issues the call to be (Heidegger 1985, 29/1971, 206). Accordingly, 
humans can be what they are only in this relation to an apparent outside—being, the world, 
the fourfold—that is in fact their very “essence,” their most “interior”—the opposition of  
inside-outside thus losing its pertinence along with the subject-object dyad.3 Human beings 
“ek-sist” and “stand out into” the world (Heidegger 1976, 324/1998, 249). They are not 
given, but must be (set) on the move to be what they are in the process of  becoming.
 Thus, the normativity is not derived from a prior non-normative ontology but originates 
with the constitutive belonging to a differential world; differential here means that neither 
Dasein nor world are static, but can come to be what they are only in unfolding differences: 
between Dasein and world, but also between thing and being (the ontico-ontological 
difference), between concealment and unconcealment, and among the four of  the fourfold 
(earth and sky, mortals and divinities). I would now like to discuss how this Heideggerian 
normativity can be developed further, on its own premises, as a critical stance. 
II. THREE LEVELS OF NORMATIVITY
Because the normativity of  being’s claim is precisely “always already” in play (for it is 
constitutive of  our being), it cannot be the case that I refuse it as I might a specific, binarily 
coded norm.4 If  I am asked not to lie, it is because I could; here, however, the demand 
to correspond to being could not be refused, for we have always already corresponded, 
otherwise there would have been no disclosure, no being-in-the-world. If  correspondence 
is necessary and happens anyway, then what do we gain for a critical phenomenology or a 
critical ontology by insisting on it? 
3 Heidegger interprets the human “essence” in terms of  the allegedly uniquely human relation to 
language and death; as special “capacities” (Vermögen), language and death permit disclosure “as such” 
(2000, 180/1971, 176; 1985, 203/1982, 107).  On understanding “as such”—much criticized by Derrida 
in his Of  Spirit (1989), Aporias (1993b) and elsewhere—see especially  Dahlstrom 2001.
4 This constitutive dependence is often understood as a transcendental condition of  possibility. For 
investigations regarding Heidegger’s use of  transcendental arguments, see Crowell and Malpas (2007).
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 Focusing still on Heidegger, I want to answer this critical question in the following 
way. While the normativity is always already operative, it calls on us to correspond to it 
more explicitly—and in the distinctions hidden in this “more” lies the critical force. The 
normativity in effect asks us to recognize our being. In Being and Time, the call (there, the 
call of  conscience) said primarily “be your being as thrown project,” that is, open up to 
given possibilities, in their very indeterminacy, as your own potential; in the 1950s, the 
normativity claims us to be our being by letting the world be, a world to which we belong 
and without which we could not be what we are. The demand now is to listen to being so as 
to appropriate our being and let the inappropriable be by belonging to the fourfold. Thus, 
the normative force, the critical potential, lies in the demand to better understand our 
ontological constitution, and a normative fault would lie, not in failing to live up to a given 
norm, but in misrecognizing this constitution. As it is put at the end of  “The Thing,” we are 
called on to take “a step back” so as to be “vigilant” (wachsam) regarding the belonging to 
the fourfold (Heidegger 2000, 183/1971, 179), when in fact our building and dwelling has 
already received its directions from the fourfold (Heidegger 2000, 161; see also Sikka 2018, 
106).5 
 Accordingly, Heidegger at times distinguishes between hearing the call, paying attention 
to it, and responsibly transforming one’s conduct in view of  heeding the call expressly. For 
instance, What is Philosophy? (1955) raises the question of  how the normativity can be both 
always already operative, and yet give rise to further elaboration and, with that, critical 
distinctions between this or that way of  hearing the call of  being. Critique emerges with 
the crucial differences between hearing the call as call (Hören rather than Überhören, that is, 
missing the very fact that one responds to a call and finds oneself  in correspondence); paying 
attention to it (darauf  achten); expressly appropriating (eigens übernehmen) it; and unfolding 
(Entfalten) the call or voice of  being (Stimme des Seins) in comportment (Heidegger 2006, 
20). 
 That Heidegger deploys the normativity in this way could be verified by a brief  re-
reading of  the well-known The Question Concerning Technology (1953/1977). In that essay, 
en-framing (Gestell) is presented as a historical mode of  being that claims humans (just 
like Zusage, Zuspruch, and so on), but it does so by withdrawing itself  in such a way that 
humans follow the call without recognizing it as call. The normative-critical potential of  
the normativity in question then lies in the demand to recognize, to “not fail to hear” 
enframing’s claim (der Anspruch des Gestells) as a claim in the first place (Heidegger 2000, 
28/1977, 26-27). Taking a step back, we should understand that in challenging-forth, we 
are in fact doing the bidding of  enframing. Commenting on Heisenberg’s claim that today 
humanity encounters only itself—a claim we hear often today in the Anthropocene as the 
idea that we’ve reached “the end of  nature,” as McKibben’s (1989) famous book put it, 
that, for example, there is no atmospherical particle untouched by human-made climate 
change (Vogel 2015)—Heidegger argues that this is an illusion that stems from overlooking 
5 Similarly, at the end of  “… poetically man dwells”, Heidegger writes: “For dwelling can be unpoetic 
[that is, technical] only because dwelling is poetic in essence,” (2000, 206/1971, 225)—that is, even 
unpoetic dwelling dwells poetically, “in essence.”
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or not hearing (Überhören) being’s claim upon us. This claim in fact makes us, in our very 
being, respondents rather than sole originators of  our projects (Heidegger 2000, 28/1977, 
26-27). As late-coming respondents, we cannot only encounter ourselves, but have been 
preceded, and in fact claimed, by a nonhuman alterity that is more powerful than we are. 
That is why we cannot become “masters of  the earth” (Heidegger 2000, 152/1971, 147). 
 The location of  the sources of  normativity in being means that we cannot neatly 
distinguish the descriptive from the prescriptive. However, we can, in principle, differentiate 
degrees of  awareness, the explicitness of  the responsivity and responsibility, and what 
Heidegger calls the ‘unfolding’ of  the normativity in question. Accordingly, this normativity 
can be analyzed on (at least) three heuristic levels: on the first, all humans are claimed by 
being (including the most ruthless homo faber); on the second, we hear the claim of  being in 
enframing, while on the third we not only hear it, but pay attention and unfold the claim 
further. The crucial normative difference is one between what we might call non-attentive 
corresponding (Level 1), attentive corresponding (Level 2), and appropriate-responsible 
comportment (Level 3), that is, an “unfolding comportment expressly taken over by us 
[von uns eigens übernommenes und sich entfaltendes Verhalten]” as our responsibility in response to 
the claim to correspond (Heidegger 2006, 20). Generally speaking, critique emerges, not 
merely with being’s claim, but with its demand to be heard and unfolded on subsequent 
levels.
 However, while these distinctions between levels permit critique, it is difficult to see how 
even the most explicit (and seemingly demanding) normativity at Level 3 could, directly 
and without further ado, give us specific norms for a critical originary ethics, as Heidegger 
claims in the Letter on Humanism. There, he draws what I deem an overly strong contrast 
between dwelling in being, which is said to give us “laws and rules,” and human reason 
as merely ‘constructing’ norms from out of  itself  (Heidegger 1976, 360/1998, 273-74). 
If  we reject this contrast as overly dichotomous, as I think we should, a more convincing 
approach would have to elaborate on attentiveness and responsible comportment. As I 
think is well known, Heidegger, who privileges the relation between being and the human, 
says little about responsible comportment among humans. When he does address politics, 
being-historical claims about our current epoch and terms such as ‘the people’ and ‘the 
state’ tend to dominate the discussion. The problem with this, as John Caputo (1993) has 
long argued, is that the claim of  being is then easily associated with a privileged locus 
of  appearance in a people or a place, a language or a time, or even in some individuals 
(marked as strong, authentic, or whatever). That is one of  the reasons we will in a moment 
turn to Derrida’s productive and critical re-reading of  Heidegger’s claim of  being. 
 As for attentiveness, Heidegger’s key point seems to me to be that recognizing the prior 
address of  being calls on us to understand it better, as indeed his various elaborations of  
being (from the meaning of  being to Ereignis) seek to do. One such better understanding 
is offered by the fourfold, which should be taken as Heidegger’s account (there could be 
others) of  what I just called the attentive corresponding demanded by the claim of  being. 
As such, the fourfold can help us better face the ever-present danger of  forgetting being 
and overemphasizing presence by focusing on the manipulability of  entities—comparable 
to what Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) called instrumental rationality—thereby missing 
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or even dismissing the process of  emergence into presence, which constitutively includes 
absencing. The critical potential of  originary ethics suggests that hearing the call of  being 
even in enframing entails greater humility before the unmasterability of  the earth in its 
differential mirror-play in the fourfold. Further, the critical potential of  Heideggerian 
normativity, while not future-directed along progressive, linear lines, also lies in opening 
up new possibilities for worlding, for what Niklas Kompridis (2006) has called possibility-
enabling practices. The address of  being, precisely by differentially playing with absence, 
can awaken us to new possibilities for disclosure, indicating that a different world is possible.
III. DERRIDA ON HEIDEGGER’S ZUSAGE
So far, I have presented Heidegger’s account in the best possible light I could give 
it here. Turning now to Derrida, I will continue to focus on the positive appropriation 
and transformation of  the claim of  being. But I will begin by briefly noting a number of  
reservations, some of  which guide Derrida’s readings explicitly. First, there is Heidegger’s 
tendency to cast the normativity in terms of  a binary, mostly famously between authenticity 
and inauthenticity (which we find as late as in his 1942 interpretation of  Antigone in 
Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”), and at times (especially during the fateful early 1930s and 
Heidegger’s revealing involvement with National Socialism) between the (implied) weak ones 
and the “strong ones [die Starken]” who can take up being’s gathering in the logos (Heidegger 
1983, 142/2000, 142).6 As we have just seen, however, the normativity in question does not 
permit a binary opposition between abiding by it or failing to do so. We are constitutively 
responding to being’s address, though there are different ways and degrees of  recognizing 
and living this active responsivity. Further, despite the crucial role of  difference, Heidegger 
locates the normativity between humanity and being, and that tends to de-differentiate both 
poles. The apparent unity of  the human makes it hard to forge a pathway towards social 
ethics or politics, and the attempts by followers of  Heidegger to extend ‘correspondence’ 
to intersubjective relations, as Waldenfels (1994) suggested, failed (Guzzoni 1980; Marx 
1983). Subsequent critical elaborations have disaggregated being in a way that foregrounds 
evolution, plants and animals, ancestors, singular others, and so on (Jonas 1966; Derrida 
2008a). The unity also opened Heidegger to the Levinasian (1969) critique of  a totalizing 
ontology that does not respect the alterity and difference of  the singular other, a critique 
that Derrida mediated and negotiated ever since the well-known early essay “Violence 
and Metaphysics,” (2001) including the claim in the essays Geschlecht I–IV that Heidegger 
papers over sexual difference (Derrida 2008b; 1993a; 2020). On the side of  being, Derrida 
has often complained of  its unity and the univocity of  its address, claiming that différance 
is “older” than the name and claim of  being (1982, 22/1972, 23). Heidegger’s account 
6 I do not mean to imply that the elitist tendencies sufficiently explain Heidegger’s (temporary) 
commitment to National Socialism, but given the infamous later reference in the same lecture to the 
“inner truth and greatness” of  the movement (1983, 152/2000, 213), the opposition between the strong 
and the weak should be given more attention.
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of  a special belonging of  humanity to being is further rejected as continuing the Western 
metaphysics of  logocentric humanism and anthropocentrism (Derrida 1989/1987, 1993b). 
 Despite these reservations and transformations, which I will not detail here, Derrida 
considers Heidegger’s work an “uncircumventable meditation” (1982, 22/1972, 22), even 
if  Derrida’s more overtly ethical and political writings are more often associated, for better 
or worse, with Levinas. Suffice it to say here that I believe the debate about whether, and 
if  so to what extent, Derrida’s “ethics” is Levinasian (pitting Bernasconi 1988, 1997, 1998; 
Critchley 1992; Caputo 1998, against Hägglund 2004, 2008; for attempts at mediation, see 
Fritsch 2011; Haddad 2013; see also Lawlor 2016, 2018), is placed in a more enlightening 
context when Heidegger is added to the mix, both as Levinas’s (2000) “obligatory passage” 
(22) and as one of  Derrida’s sources (Fritsch 2013b). Here, I will seek to show that Derrida 
primarily re-elaborates Heidegger’s ontological ‘normativity’ (a term Derrida rarely uses 
in his own name, though there are exceptions, e.g. Derrida 1992a, 62/1991, 85) in the 
form of  Anspruch, Zuspruch or Zusage by focusing on a long footnote to Of  Spirit: Heidegger 
and the Question. The note, which had been prompted by Françoise Dastur’s well-informed 
intervention, is meant to acknowledge that the troublesome proximity in Heidegger between 
“spirit” and the priority of  Dasein’s questioning becomes more complicated in Heidegger’s 
later work. Noting the shift from Dasein’s questioning to its responsivity to a language that 
comes in advance of  the question, Derrida writes:
Anfrage and Nachfrage [the questioning that Being and Time sees as basic 
to Dasein’s understanding of  being] presuppose this advance, this 
fore-coming [prévenante] address (Zuspruch) of  language. Language 
is already there, in advance (im voraus) at the moment at which any 
question can arise about it. In this it exceeds the question. This 
advance is, before any contract, a sort of  promise of  originary 
alliance to which we must have in some sense already acquiesced, 
already said yes, given a pledge [Cette avance est, avant tout contrat, une sorte 
de promesse ou d’alliance originaire à laquelle nous devons avoir en quelque sorte 
déjà acquiescé, déjà dit oui, donné un gage] whatever may be the negativity 
or problematicity of  the discourse which may follow. This promise, 
this reply which is produced a priori in the form of  acquiescence, 
this commitment of  language towards language [cet engagement de 
la parole envers la parole], this giving of  language by language and to 
language is what Heidegger at this point regularly names Zusage. 
(1989, 129/1987, 148)
Derrida is here commenting on Heidegger, to be sure, but he is also translating the latter’s 
vocabulary into his own. He stresses several elements that we can rediscover in passages 
that he used in his own name, often extensively. Some of  these elements that Derrida 
appropriates from Heidegger’s Zuspruch and Zusage include: 
(i) the gift of  language by language (not by some other instance), which is also the 
gift of  phenomenality in general, or the gift of  world that exceeds the question 
and the questioner from an irretrievable past toward an unforeseeable future; 
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(ii) the notion of  an advance and what is here called prévenance that comes before 
and obliges us by holding us responsible; 
(iii) the pledge that is a response to the promise of  the world, the promise of  an 
originary belonging as what Derrida sometimes indeed calls the promise as 
world (2017, 47/1995b, 39);
(iv) finally, the notion of  an involuntary affirmation, a saying yes to what comes 
before and exceeds the present.
 
It would be worthwhile to discuss these four notions (gift, advance or prévenance, promise, and 
affirmation) first in isolation before showing how they cooperate to give rise to the normativity 
(what I will call a normativity beyond norms) of  the conjunction of  deconstruction and 
critique that I will propose. Here, I will focus on affirmation as the source of  critique, 
referencing the gift, the advance, and the promise only in passing. 
IV. DOUBLE AFFIRMATION 
In my reading of  Heidegger’s originary ethics, I have stressed the role of  difference in the 
source of  normativity: constitutive difference means a being is not given as what it is, but 
must return to itself  in response to difference in its very belonging. Unsurprisingly, this role 
of  difference becomes more pronounced in Derrida. Deconstruction views an object of  
investigation as emerging out of  its constitutive differential relations to others. The object 
is not seen as pre-existing its context but to owe itself  to the environment of  its emergence 
and being. Difference, as Saussure had it, is prior to identity. But—and here indeed lies a 
difference between a certain Saussure and deconstruction (Bertram 2002b; Bennington 
2004)—the context itself  is not taken to be exhaustively analyzable, as if  we could list all 
of  its elements in a complete list. The context is itself  undergoing change as it constitutes 
the elements of  which it is made up. Each element in the context is in a similar position of  
changing with its context, the context changing with them, so that no element can bounce 
off a stable identity. Further, and for the same reason, the dependence on a constitutive 
context is not fully determining for an element, for it persists only in the process of  re-
contextualizing iteration. 
 The well-known neologism of  différance is meant to capture these two moments of  
differentiation and iterability: a differential situation in context and recontextualizing 
deferral, anticipation of  future environments (for not anything goes) and exposure to 
an open-ended, unforeseeable future of  iterations. And despite having first developed it 
primarily in the context of  structuralist accounts of  language and culture, it is the notion 
of  différance that Derrida sees—against Heidegger’s limiting of  being’s address to human 
beings—as structuring and claiming mortal life in general (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, 
63/2001, 106-07; Glendinning 2001, 108). Resisting assimilation to the linguistic turn, 
Derrida has from the beginning insisted that différance holds wherever there are elements in 
a more or less holistic system, for instance, DNA or organisms in an environment (1995a, 
268-69/1992b, 282-84; Derrida and Ferraris 2001, 76-77).
                                                         On the Sources of Critique in Heidegger and Derrida • 73Matthias Fritsch
Puncta    Vol. 4.2    2021
 An identity, then, does not come into the world identical to itself. Its very “itself ” depends 
on re-identifications, by others and by itself. Responding to its differential context, identity 
must seek its identity in an ever-deferred future and an immemorial past, a non-origin 
that prompts the inventions of  origin. With this seeking, performativity and normativity 
have become inseparable from identity. Identity must rely, and from the beginning, on a 
repetition that promises the same. In the case of  a living entity capable of  thus intending 
its future repetition, we could speak of  a self-affirmation that expects or promises to come 
back to itself  despite its need to refer and appropriate from others in the context into which 
différance will have cast it. But if  self-affirmation requires differentiation from its environment, 
then this context precedes the affirmation, and is affirmed first of  all in a way that permits 
us to see the context as prompting the affirmation. An identity must always already have 
affirmed the preceding context from which it is in the process of  appropriating to be self-
affirmative in the first place. That is why the language of  “self-affirmation” is misleading, 
making it seem as if  affirmation originated with a “self ” when in fact any sense of  self  or 
identity only emerges in the on-going affirmation. Again, here the grammar of  the middle 
voice might help, which Derrida indeed claims for différance (1982, 9/1972, 8-9) and also 
for aimance (1997, 23 n. 3/1994b, 24-25 n. 5), the “lovence” or “minimal friendship” that, 
as I will discuss briefly below, names another inflection of  affirmation. Lacking the middle 
voice, we tend to resort to reflexive constructions, such as “affirmation affirms (itself)” (recall 
Heidegger’s “speech speaks” or “world worlds”), constructions which posit an ‘itself ’ or a 
reflexive self-relation, that is, an identity there where it is precisely originary differentiation 
that prompts the always incomplete re-identification.
On account of  its relation to differentiation, affirmation is double, a duplicity that 
further doubles itself  (Derrida 2002, 247; 2011, 112, 122ff., 140-01, 182/1986, 129, 140ff., 
161-62, 208). Affirmation must affirm the self  and the other, the one to affirm the other, 
but also, at the same time and in the same moment, repeat itself, that is, affirm or promise 
its future repetition. In parsing out the duplicity, we can try to analytically separate that 
which is inseparable in affirmation. First, affirmation must affirm, along with the self, the 
other-than-self; otherness here ranges from the future self, to other identities, to the open-
ended context. With no recourse to a meta-language or view from nowhere, affirmation 
is a response to preceding contexts, contexts that are affirmed alongside the future self  in 
process. Second, the self-other-reference must “from the beginning” (but the beginning 
is already a response) affirm to repeat the affirmation in the future. In view of  the next 
section on critique, it helps if  we see this future as itself  split into two futures to be affirmed, 
introducing a third duplicity. Affirmation must affirm the future of  its self-repetition (hence, 
a future in which its self  is promised, a future horizon or world in which the self  is claimed 
to continue) as well as an open-ended future, a future it cannot anticipate (Derrida 2002, 
247). The open-ended future-to come (l’à-venir), which Specters of  Marx, following Walter 
Benjamin in particular, calls “messianic without messianism” (1994a, 227, 74, 92/1993c, 
96, 110, 124), is not a mere accident but is “quasi-transcendentally” necessary and thus must 
be affirmed as enabling of  the self.7 It indicates the inexhaustibility or indeterminability of  
7 For more on the idea of  “quasi-transcendental” conditions of  possibility in Derrida, permit me to refer 
to Fritsch (2005, chapter 2; 2011).
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context, and hence the possibility of  relaunching toward another context. This possibility is 
affirmed along with, or in and through, the affirmation of  the preceding context. However, 
this future to-come is also the essential possibility of  alteration, contamination, and death.
 Double affirmation provides an entry-point to the range of  social-ontological-cum-
normative concepts that so prominently populate Derrida’s texts from the 1980s onwards: 
justice beyond law, unconditional hospitality, friendship, the gift, responsibility, democracy-
to-come, and the like. To give a brief  indication, let us elaborate how affirmation radiates out 
into friendship, the aimance whose middle voice we just mentioned. Drawing on Heidegger’s 
account of  the friendly “correspondence” between being and the human, but seeking to 
overcome its harmonious “logocentrism” by differentiating the human into singularities, 
aimance names the “anterior affirmation of  being-together in allocution” (affirmation antérieure 
de l’être-ensemble dans l’allocution) (Derrida 1997, 249/1994b, 279). As such an affirmation, it 
gives rise to a “community without community” (62/81) or a “sort of  minimal community” 
(236/263), prior to positive law and specific forms of  community. Every political identity 
and every social relation, no matter how antagonistic, can only be thought on the basis 
of  a prior affirmation, consent, promise, and minimal friendship. One way in which this 
anterior affirmation of  the other and others in social and political space manifests itself, 
Derrida argues, is as the promise to keep affirming oneself  and the other, to go on speaking 
(not to “ghost” the other), and to abstain from violence. This nonchosen, heterononomic 
promise to tell the truth and to abstain from violence entails a “minimum of  friendship or 
consent” (Derrida 1997, 214/1994b, 243) that spells out the “law of  originary sociality” 
(loi de socialité originaire) (231/258). This law ‘before law’ does not create the commonality 
of  a shared space, but, precisely on account of  its necessary advance, the precedence of  an 
unmasterable alterity—another feature we saw Derrida highlight in response to Heidegger’s 
Zusage. This precedence entails that “we are caught up, one and another, in a sort of  
heterononomic and dissymmetrical curving of  social space (une sorte de courbure hétéronomique 
et dissymétrique de l’espace social)—more precisely, a curving of  the relation to the other: prior 
to all organized socius, all politeia, all determined government, before all ‘law’” (231/258, 
translation modified). What precedes me, for Derrida, is thus not just the differential play 
of  being, but with this play, the alterity of  others before and with me, other living beings 
and animals in evolution as well as ancestors and the contemporaries born before as well as 
after me. The gift of  phenomenality and language in general is articulated in the terrestrial 
and intergenerational gifting that makes my life possible while of  course also constraining 
it (Fritsch 2018a).  
 It is important to grasp the link between the advance of  language and the promise of  
a minimal friendship that commits me to the singular other. In the context of  linguistic 
interactions, the fact that I must already have affirmed language entails for Derrida that I 
promise to speak the truth and refrain from violence (Barbour 2017b). At the risk of  once 
more merely shifting agency away from speakers to language, we could say that language—
the play of  differences, that Derrida no longer restricts to human speech, though of  course 
we must also retain its specificity—commits me to the other, by forcing me to promise 
to speak the truth (even if  and especially if  I lie, and if  my sincerity or insincerity must 
remain what Derrida calls a “secret” to the other, as Barbour [2017a] shows). The force 
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lies in the fact that the advance, the gift of  language, enables my being and my speaking 
in the first place, but such that, on account of  its differential play, disables my identity as 
merely given or constant. Double affirmation thus turns into a futural promise to keep 
on being the speaker I implied I was, and that means, to keep on speaking, to stand for 
what I said, to ask the other to believe my sincerity and to commit to truth, despite the 
fact that these turn out to be unkeepable promises (Derrida 1997, 214/1994b, 243). For, 
if  meaning depends on context, and contexts necessarily change due to the differentiation 
requirement, then I cannot mean exactly the same thing today as I did when I made the 
promise, or the promise was being made through and with me. As I argue elsewhere, this 
necessary aporicity of  the higher-order normative conditions of  communication is one of  
the major differences between Habermas’s transcendental pragmatics and Derrida’s quasi-
transcendental analysis (Fritsch 2013a, 2019a, 2019b).
V. AFFIRMATION AND CRITIQUE
I began by calling on critical theory and political thought not to prioritize normative or 
ontological considerations, but to afford sufficient room to both beyond the worn-out fact-
value dichotomy. Heidegger and Derrida do this in a particular way, namely by showing 
how normativity emerges with “ontology,” “hauntology,” or “quasi-transcendental” 
argumentation. I want to conclude by coming back to this in the form of  indicating how 
double affirmation might relate to critique. The last two centuries have produced a number 
of  different conceptions of  critique (for an overview, see de Boer (2012) for phenomenology 
and “affirmative critique,” see also Marder (2014, especially 135ff.). Here I have in 
mind only a very general form that is sufficiently widespread to merit treatment. On this 
conception, critique draws on normative standards to evaluate actions, policies, institutions, 
and so on. For many social and political theorists, the first and most significant task is thus 
to justify norms that can serve as critical standards in assessing a given situation, institution, 
or society. At least in rudimentary form, the norms imply, or may be extrapolated toward, 
an ideal situation, institution, or society. Social and political critique is then enabled by the 
gap between the actual and the ideal. On this view, by justifying their norms, critics give 
themselves the authority to accuse as well as to judge. In inheriting Marx, Derrida makes 
clear he endorses (but also significantly transforms, as we will see) this form of  “idealist” or 
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Marxist critique, despite the reservations Derrida expresses about critique:8 
The recourse to a certain spirit of  the Marxist critique remains urgent 
and will have to remain indefinitely necessary in order to denounce 
and reduce the gap [the gap between an empirical reality and a 
regulating ideal {l’écart entre une réalité empirique et un idéal régulateur}] as 
much as possible, in order to adjust ‘reality’ to the ‘ideal’ in the course 
of  a necessarily infinite process. This Marxist critique can still be 
fruitful if  one knows how to adapt it to new conditions. (1994a, 
107/1993c, 143)
Although Derrida warns us, earlier in the same text, not to identify deconstruction with 
critique (1994a, 86/1993c, 116), he can, I would say, endorse this spirit of  critique as 
one (but only one) dimension of  double affirmation, the one that, as we saw, affirms the 
horizonal future of  anticipation. A crucial task for this conjunction of  deconstruction and 
critique would then consist in developing norms and ideals in response to affirmation. The 
discussion of  friendship may have given an albeit brief  indication as to how this might 
be done. (For a more elaborate attempt in the context of  justice between generations, see 
Fritsch 2018a, 2020; see also Fritsch 2018b for a related attempt in environmental ethics.)
 But, as we saw, double affirmation relates us also to a non-horizonal future, and so 
deconstruction is not simply critique. In this distance from critique, deconstruction poses 
questions about the critical stance and its operation (Derrida 1994a, 86/1993c, 116). On its 
reverse side, affirmation relates critique to the open-ended future to-come, to the promise 
of  a justice without horizon of  anticipation, and to the “undeconstructibility” of  justice 
beyond positive law (1994a, 112/1993c, 147). True to affirmation in this double sense, 
then, Derrida goes on to claim that “a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a 
certain experience of  the promise” (1994a, 111/1993c, 146) should be understood to be 
the “ground” or “soil” of  critique, a “ground that is not yet critique, even if  it is not, not yet, 
pre-critique” (un sol qui n’est pas encore critique, même s’il n’est pas, pas encore, précritique) (1994a, 
110/1993c, 145, translation modified). The projection of  critical horizons must recognize 
the precedence of  double affirmation as the very source of  critique, but also as limitation 
and principled contestability of  such horizons (Fritsch 2005, 96ff.). Prior to critique, critical 
8 Indeed, at times Derrida seems to contrast affirmation and critique, at least if  the latter is “dogmatic”: 
speaking of  Glas he suggests its operations pursue “a deconstruction . . . that would be affirmative” and 
that “is not a critical operation; it takes critique as its object,” especially the trust and authority granted 
to “the deciding agency, the ultimate possibility of  the decidable: deconstruction is a deconstruction of  
critical dogmatics [la dogmatique critique]” (1995a, 54/1992b, 59-60). Specters of  Marx distinguishes “the 
spirit of  Marxist critique” from “what could be called, to go quickly, a deconstruction, there where 
the latter is no longer simply a critique” because of  “the questions it poses to any critique and even to 
any question” (1994a, 86/1993c, 116). What I say below about the relation between affirmation and 
critique is meant to take undecidability as well as distrust of  the critic’s authority into account. Alongside 
undecidability, we should also note the paradox of  a deconstruction that poses questions about any 
critical question. As we will see, affirmation and critical questioning cannot, for Derrida, be situated at 
different levels of  priority.
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theory is to take note of  a more or less involuntary but constitutive affirmation of  quasi-
holistic networks such as social and ecological webs, language, and inheritance. As one way 
to see this, we can begin by viewing critique itself  as subject to double affirmation: to be 
what it is, critique must affirm itself  in the double and spatio-temporal sense I discussed 
above.
 For Derrida, to deconstruct critique is to “radicalize” it, and to radicalize it is to insist 
that it must, for its very being, perpetually affirm itself  as critique. For critique to affirm 
itself  qua critique, it must critique itself  (1994a, 116/1993c, 143). The idea in this case is 
not that critique, to be consistent and fair, should not make an exception for itself; this would 
be to already subject it to the norm of  universality. If  the “must” in “critique must critique 
itself ” was only normative in this sense, critique could respond that, once it had sufficiently 
secured—for example procedurally—the justice of  its standards, these would then be beyond 
critique; any other critique would already presuppose them. (This is, in effect, Apel’s and 
Habermas’s strategy in using performative contradictions; see Habermas 1990, 79ff.) By 
contrast, différance entails that the demand that critique re-affirm itself  by criticizing itself  is 
also quasi-ontological (or, in the language of  Specters, hauntological): necessarily changing 
contexts, contexts that critique needs to be what it is, demand that critique open itself  to its 
own transformation. It must “want itself ” to be better, to reinterpret itself  in new contexts, 
to overcome itself  (Derrida 1994a, 110/1993c, 145). It must affirm itself  as itself  but so as 
to open itself  to its becoming other. For this reason, critique must avoid over-confidence in 
progressive histories as well as in procedural norms and projected ideals, however carefully 
and consultative (that is, procedurally just) their determination may have been. To conceive 
of  itself  as being what it is only by becoming other, and to open itself  to the demands of  
shifting contexts, including other voices in that context, means that critique must, for its 
very being, allow itself  to be contested, in particular by those marginalized and oppressed 
by inherited life worlds and projected ideals. That is why the exordium to Specters of  Marx 
insists that no justice can be thought without “the principle of  some responsibility”
before the ghosts of  those who are not yet born or who are already 
dead, be they victims of  wars, political or other kinds of  violence, 
nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of  exterminations, 
victims of  the oppressions of  capitalist imperialism or any of  the 
forms of  totalitarianism. (1994a, xviii/1993c, 15)
 For critics, this means they must situate themselves, in specific, varying ways, in a history 
of  violence and take responsibility for dead and unborn victims. They cannot proceed as 
if  they were, qua critics, free of  history, language, and earth. To claim the precedence of  
affirmation vis-à-vis critique is precisely to insist that the critic has always already affirmed 
the context and the language in which she formulates her critique, and that critique is not 
only to be aware of  its own never quite neutral perspective, but is to proceed from this 
non-totalizable, non-objectifiable belonging. Affirmation, then, is undertaken neither by 
reference to a given community or identity, nor in view of  a critical ideal projected into the 
future; in this sense, too, affirmation is “non-positive” (it does not affirm a bounded content) 
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and necessarily transgressive of  boundaries (Derrida 1995a, 357/1992b, 368).9 
 We already heard that the normativity at issue asks to be elaborated further, including 
possibly in the form of  propositional norms (e.g., the truth-telling requirement of  speaking 
to the other). Despite this relation to norms and projected ideals, the normativity of  double 
affirmation remains excessive to them; it is what we might call a normativity beyond 
norms. To see the specific import of  this, let me return to the normativity of  critique. If  we 
have always already affirmed, and remain in the process of  affirming, our differential yet 
constitutive relation to other humans and nonhumans, living and dead or not yet born, then 
we are affirming our dependence and vulnerability. We are vulnerable to the withholding 
of  the support that we get from something larger on which we depend. Derrida speaks 
of  this something that, in his words, “is larger and older and more powerful and more 
durable” than individuals, under many names: the system of  differences, the structure 
of  iterability, inheritance, friendship, sur-vivance, the world of  life-death (or the earth as 
history and habitat of  life), and so on (2004, 5/2001, 18). The constitutive insertedness 
into something larger that precedes, exceeds, and outlives the individual obligates: it asks to 
be received, affirmed, transformed, questioned, filtered, re-interpreted, and handed down 
(2004, 5-6/2001, 18). As indicated, this thought has significant potential for rethinking 
environmental and intergenerational justice; but here I want to return to the theme of  
critique, especially in its more overt institutional and political dimension. 
 Here we should take note of  the conjunction of  affirmation and vulnerability. 
Affirmation cannot but affirm dependence on others who also make up the differential-
iterable structure of  life and death. Affirmation should be understood as a response, not 
to Heidegger’s being or language as such, but to an ineradicable vulnerability, mortality, 
dependence, and difference of  the self  from itself  and others. The theme of  vulnerability 
may be the best measure of  our distance from, but also still recognizable continuity with, 
Heidegger’s Zusage. As we saw, for Heidegger’s ear, Dasein is not first of  all questioning being 
but addressed by its “granting saying” in a language that calls on us to recognize and affirm 
our belonging to the play of  being. In Derrida, this belated responsivity, this coming late 
to a meeting with oneself, entails being put in question by a differentiating immersion that 
renders the addressee vulnerable to the immemorial claim of  preceding-exceeding others. 
Accordingly, as we will indicate, affirmation and critical questioning become inseparable 
moments. 
 For social and political critique, dependent, vulnerable responsivity implies the following. 
It is not that there are living (human) beings who happen to be mortal and vulnerable (mortality 
as one of  their characteristics we have to take into consideration among others, such as 
species, gender, etc.), and for that reason set up protective institutions: parenting, kinship 
relations, cooperative mechanisms regarding production and consumption of  goods and 
9 In an early essay on Bataille, Derrida (2001, n. 15) retrieves the notion of  nonpositive affirmation from 
Foucault’s essay on Bataille (1980, 35ff.). It might be worthwhile to pursue the link between Derridian 
affirmation (always also an affirmation of  that which exceeds what his Bataille essay calls restricted econ-
omies) and Foucaultian transgression.
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services, defensive alliances, and so on. Rather, individual human beings can come about 
and perpetuate their existence because such institutional and ecosystemic structures have 
come into existence as a result of  biological evolution and as well as of  ancestral building 
and planning. These preceding structures take that vulnerability into consideration from 
the beginning. As Benjamin (2003) says in his Theses on the Concept of  History, “we have been 
expected on earth,” some more and others less (390). To live is (first of  all, and not in a 
merely secondary, derivative way) to affirm having benefited from such protective set-ups, 
and to continue to benefit from their shelter, their food, their recognition. The double 
normativity of  affirmation (it affirms self  and other, past and future, horizon and non-
horizon) is thus prior to, though inseparable from, the lifeworld norms that sheltering and 
feeding institutions will bring forth. Such norms live off the performativity of  affirmation, 
without the latter being reducible to the former. Affirmation precedes and exceeds the 
particular configuration of  the extant, positive norms we have inherited. 
 If  we now say, quite rightly, that it belongs to the meaning of  a norm to be general—to 
cover similar cases, and to treat them alike—the institutional arrangements that support 
lives, and the norms they carry in more or less codified fashion, are not by their nature 
universal and egalitarian—or if  they are, then always insufficiently so. They are designed 
to sustain some lives rather than others. In Lisa Guenther’s (2020) felicitous formulation of  
the tasks of  critical phenomenology, such inherited institutional set-ups and their norms 
entail “quasi-transcendental” “ways of  seeing and even ways of  making the world” (12). The 
differentiality of  the support systems asserts itself  here. The conflict between equal treatment 
and singular care, between universalism and favoring the near-and-dear, is intrinsic and 
endemic, and can only be addressed in better or in worse ways, not eliminated (Menke 
2006; Fritsch 2010; Bankovsky 2013). Gender, race, class, nationality, ability, species, and 
contemporaneity may be the most prominent ways in which living, vulnerable beings are 
demarcated, often in less binary and more subtle ways than these concepts suggest. Support 
systems come with their own ways of  shaping (and hiding this shaping) deeply ingrained 
ways of  seeing and making the world. It is the task of  critical phenomenology to bring 
to the foreground what is often taken for granted: nationalism, ableism, racism, sexism, 
humanism, colonialism, capitalist classism, and presentism.
 That is one reason why normative political theory, though helpful at some point, is 
insufficient for critique. Critique should not just be based on an answer to the question: how 
would an ideal normative order configure various values and norms, some inherited and 
intuitively appealing, others more reflective and theoretically worked up? Critique needs 
to work from the genealogy of  inherited normative orders and power structures that have 
emerged to support and elevate some lives at the expense of  others (Mills 2014). And the 
critic should understand that her own position owes itself  to such a history from which she 
cannot fully extricate herself, and from which her very writing and talking proceeds without 
ever being reducible to it.
 Given the conflictual and exclusionary nature of  lifeworld set-ups, affirmation is not 
just prior to critique, but also needs it. Without at least the stirrings of  critique, affirmation 
would be no more than a “blind submission” to history and the powers that be (Derrida 
1994a, 7/1993c, 28). Due to its very duplicity and structural incompleteness, affirmation 
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cannot but also engender some resistance to, and so some critique of, its inheritance in view 
of  the future. But the source of  this critical resistance to inherited norms and institutions 
is not to be found in a given universal. Rather, the perpetual source of  critique lies in 
indetermination, in the inevitable deviation between norm and normed. Non-positive 
affirmation cannot but also affirm inherited arrangements, but is never exhaustively codified 
by them; in its iteration, it re-sets the set-up and re-opens heritable structures and their 
norms, breaching a pathway for possibility-disclosing critique. Affirmation is the bridge, 
the white noise, the interference between received norms and the norms the critic holds up 
against tradition. Critique finds itself  exceeded, undone, contested, and to-be-redone by 
a mortal vulnerability that cannot be exhaustively captured by propositional norms; even 
if  elaborated in terms of  specific norms, it remains a normativity beyond norms. Isolated 
from critique, affirmation would be insufficient, but the critic cannot do without it: she must 
draw on its iterative force to solicit her lifeworld. Critique is born of  the excess, resistance, 
and undecidability with which double affirmation affects and overwhelms any normative 
order.
 To conclude, then, critique should be seen to unceasingly proceed from affirmation to 
avoid the critic’s overconfidence or good conscience, insist on undecidability as the condition 
of  just decision-making, and reveal the intricate imbrication of  critique in contexts of  
historical violence and fragile ecologies that are to some extent withdrawn from critique.
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